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JANUS: OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DEATH OF
STARE DECISIS, BUT ONLY AS IT RELATES TO
UNIONS
By Amanda R. Clark and Susan M. Matta
Amanda Clark is an associate at Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, Ltd., joining the firm in 2013. She
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units across the state, dealing with contract negotiations, interest arbitrations and contract
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Chicago-Kent College of Law graduating with a Certificate in Labor and Employment Law from
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Illinois by Leading Lawyers.
Susan Matta is a partner with Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, Ltd. Her union career began in 1995,
when she entered the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute’s Apprenticeship Program, and later
became a staff union organizer at UFCW Local 951, where she worked on NLRB election
campaigns and corporate pressure campaigns. After graduating from law school, Susan served
as a Law Fellow with Service Employees International Union on a corporate pressure campaign
against a local hospital chain, where she represented individuals who were sued for medical
debt. Susan then served as the General Counsel for Service Employees International Union,
Local 73 for almost ten years, where she represented both public and private employees. As inhouse General Counsel, Susan gained invaluable and extensive knowledge of the institutional
concerns and needs of unions, conducted numerous trainings for both staff and members, and
gained extensive experience representing the union in negotiations, arbitrations, State and
Federal Court, and before the National Labor Relations Board, Illinois Labor Relations Board,
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enforcement, interest arbitration, unfair labor practice proceedings, and court litigation. In
2019, she joined Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, where she continues to focus on representing firefighter
clients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Forty-one years ago, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,[1] the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of what is commonly
referred to as “fair share” or “agency” fees. Fair share fees apply to
governmental employees who are in a bargaining unit represented by a
union, but choose not to become members of the union. The Abood Court
weighed employee free speech rights against the government’s managerial
interests, and found that the government’s interest in labor peace
outweighed any harm caused by requiring employees to pay fair share
fees.[2] Exclusive representation is an essential element of labor peace.
Without it, government employers would be faced with conflicting demands
from various sources, thereby, impeding the provision of public services.[3]
The Court found that the government had an interest in a financially stable
bargaining partner.[4] However, recognizing that unions engage in political
activities, the Court found that employees could not be required to subsidize
political causes they opposed.[5] The Court balanced the conflciting interests
by requiring non-members to pay fees associated only with “collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,” and
prohibiting unions from charging non-members for their political and
ideological activities.[6]
In response, “[o]ver 20 States have by now enacted statutes authorizing fairshare provisions. To be precise, 22 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico–plus another two States for police and firefighter unions.”[7]
Illinois is one of those States. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(“IPLRA”) is founded upon strong public policy favoring collective
bargaining rights for public employees.[8] In addition to the establishment
of the right to organize, bargain collectively through an exclusive
representative, and strike,[9] the IPLRA requires non-members to pay fair
share fees to unions that represent them.[10]
Mark Janus, a non-member of a bargaining unit represented by the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31,
was required to pay a fair share fee of a mere $44.58 per month, or $535 per
year.[11] He challenged the imposition of these fair share fees on the basis
that they violated his First Amendment rights by compelling him to support
the union. In Janus, the Court relied upon the dicta from Knox v. Service
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Employees International Union, Local 1000 and Harris v. Quinn, that
referred to the Abood decision as an “an anomaly.”[12] The Court overturned
Abood and held the fair share fees unconstitutional.
The Janus decision is wrought with contradictions and personal opinions on
unions. It is a decision that can only be characterized as legislating from the
bench; it is evident from the majority opinion, that this decision was crafted
six years ago, and the Court simply waited for the right opportunity to
overturn Abood. Sadly, this is not the most troubling aspect of the Court’s
ruling, as the decision flies in the face of the principles of stare decisis,
represents a significant step away from promoting democracy in the
workplace, and raises more constitutional questions than it resolves. In
addition, as will be discussed below, the Janus decision undermines our
system of jurisprudence, and is completely contrary to the very notion of
democracy.
II. ABOOD FIT SQUARELY WITHIN FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES
The Court’s initial rationale for overturning Abood stems from the misplaced
notion that fair share fees amount to compelling the fee-payer “to subsidize”
the speech of other private speakers.[13] Relying on Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Assn.,[14] Knox, and Harris, the majority determined that fair
share fees failed the exacting scrutiny test.[15] This test requires “a
compelled subsidy [to] serve ‘a compelling state interest that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.’”[16] The majority determined that “the First Amendment does
not permit the government to compel a person to pay for another party’s
speech just because the government thinks that the speech furthers the
interests of the person who does not want to pay.”[17]
The majority’s rationale suffers from significant flaws. Perhaps, the most
glaring flaw is the comparison between unions and groups that lobby on
behalf of “senior citizens or veterans or physicians.”[18] Such an analogy
ignores the unique nature of the legal relationship between unions and
bargaining unit employees. Unlike unions, these other groups are not
required to represent any interests held by non-members. Rather, any
benefits conferred upon non-members are incidental to the group’s efforts to
benefit its members. In addition, these groups are allowed to give members
special benefits to make membership more attractive. On the other hand,
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unions are required to fairly represent all bargaining unit employees,
regardless of membership status, which includes pursuing costly litigation
on behalf of non-members. This obligation significantly impedes a union’s
ability to make membership more attractive. Accordingly, the Janus Court’s
analogy completely misses the mark.
Moreover, the Court’s findings are completely contrary to long-standing
precedent. “The Court’s decisions have long made plain that government
entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’ speech,
especially about the terms of employment, in the interest of operating their
workplaces effectively.”[19] Indeed, the Abood Court acknowledged the
importance of labor peace, and the “significant benefits” resulting from
exclusive representation and an adequately funded exclusive
representative.[20] The Court has consistently upheld government
restrictions on speech related to workplace operations.[21] Fair share fees
are an example of an allowable governmental restriction on employee speech
because they advance the government’s interest in regulating the workplace.
When a union engages in collective bargaining or contract enforcement, the
speech involved in those activities is “intimately tied to the workplace and
employment relationship” because it “occurred (almost always) in the
workplace; and the speech was directed (at least mainly) to the
employer.”[22] Thus, fair share fees have long been considered a permissible
restriction on employee speech rights.
Contrary to this approach, the Janus majority now finds that compelling
speech is a far greater injury than restricting it.[23] The majority views fair
share fees in the same light as compelled speech based on the notion that
“compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First
Amendment rights.”[24] Yet, as Justice Kagan notes in her dissent, “the
majority’s distinction between compelling and restricting speech also lacks
force” because the only case cited in support of this argument “is possibly
(thankfully) the most exceptional in our First Amendment annals.”[25]
Importantly, the majority ignores the unique nature of the relationship
between exclusive representation and fair share fees. Although the majority
recognizes that the requirement imposed upon unions to serve as an
exclusive representative is “itself a significant impingement on associational
freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts,” it rejects the notion
that exclusive representation and agency fees are inextricably linked.[26]
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Apparently, sufficient justification for this proposition is evident in how
“avidly” unions seek to represent employees in states that do not permit fair
share fees.[27] For these reasons, the majority believes that fair share fees
impermissibly compel one to not only support, but also subsidize, the speech
of another.[28]
The majority view demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of collective bargaining. Public sector unions are comprised solely of
governmental employees, and exist for the purpose of representing all
bargaining unit employees concerning their terms and conditions of
employment. “The tasks of negotiating and administering a collectivebargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling
disputes and processing grievances are continuing and difficult ones,”
requiring the “expenditure of much time and money.”[29] Simply stated, no
other situation is even remotely analogous to the plight now faced by unions
– where an entity is compelled by the government to provide expensive and
valuable services for free. Notwithstanding the balance struck by Abood,
which remained workable for over four decades, the Supreme Court now
finds that fair share fees cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
A.

States Continue to Have Compelling Justifications for
Imposing Agency Fees

The Abood Court deferred to the State’s interest in maintaining labor peace
and preventing free riders as compelling justifications for permitting fair
share fees.[30] However, the Janus majority summarily dismisses these
justifications in the absence of compelling reasons. As the Abood Court
recognized, labor peace and exclusive representation are inextricably
intertwined.[31] Exclusive representation avoids conflicts associated with
inter-union rivalries, multiple demands from multiple unions for the same
groups of employees, and confusion stemming from having to enforce
multiple collective bargaining agreements that cover the same groups of
employees.[32] Unable to argue that labor peace is not a compelling state
interest, the majority criticizes the lack of “evidence that the pandemonium
[the Abood Court] imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed,”
claiming that such “fears were unfounded.”[33] But the majority goes further
and finds that “[t]he Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the
exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency
fees are inextricably linked, but that is simply not true.”[34]
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To illustrate its point, the majority cites to the experiences in federal
employment and the twenty-eight states that require exclusive
representation without agency fees.[35] The majority finds that, because
labor peace can be achieved without imposing fair share fees, the two are not
“inextricably linked.”[36] The majority also finds that the benefits and
privileges associated with its status as the exclusive representative “greatly
outweigh any extra burden imposed by the duty of providing fair
representation for nonmembers.”[37] The majority’s anti-union sentiments
are perhaps most evident in the gross understatement of the union’s duty of
fair representation–that it obligates the union to refrain from acting solely for the
benefit of members.[38] Indeed, the duty of fair representation imposes far
greater obligations, and costs, upon unions than the majority is willing to
admit. Instead of addressing this dilemma, the majority simply ignores it.
Fair share fees are rooted “in the ‘principle of exclusive union
representation’–a ‘central element’ in ‘industrial relations’ since the New
Deal.”[39] Consequently, the courts “have granted substantial latitude to the
government, in recognition of its significant interests in managing its
workforce so as to best serve the public.”[40] Thus, Abood does not stand for
the proposition that all government employers should permit fair share fees.
Rather, it gives proper deference to governmental employers who choose to
manage their workforces by permitting fair share fees. Accordingly, the fact
that some governmental employers hold different views on how to achieve
labor peace is of no consequence, as employers often believe that unions need
adequate funding for exclusive representation to work.[41]
The majority also dismisses the free-rider concerns addressed in Abood.[42]
Relying on Knox, the majority finds that “avoiding free riders is not a
compelling interest.”[43] Pointing to the fact that unions continue to seek to
represent employees in states that do not permit fair share fees, the majority
essentially faults unions for their persistence in organizing in those
states.[44] After all, under the Knox theory, if the benefits derived from
exclusive representation are not outweighed by the burden of a prohibition
against fair share fees, surely, unions would refrain from organizing in those
states.[45] This reasoning demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
the nature of fair share fee arrangements. Labor relations and fair share fees
are policy matters that are best left to state and local legislatures, not the
judiciary, to decide. That unions continue to seek exclusive representative
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status in right to work states is not a compelling reason to depart from the
traditional deference given to governmental employers when dealing with
policy matters and workplace regulation.
Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that this decision improperly penalizes
unions by making union membership significantly less attractive. The
majority recognizes that “government may not ‘impose penalties or withhold
benefits based on membership in a disfavored group’ where doing so
‘ma[kes] group membership less attractive.”[46] However, as Justice Kagan
points out, “basic economic theory shows why a government would think
that agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work. What
ties the two together, as Abood recognized, is the likelihood of free-riding
when fees are absent.”[47] Unlike other special interest groups that can make
membership more attractive by offering special benefits to members, unions
are prohibited from treating members and non-members differently. Thus,
requiring unions to represent everyone equally without requiring those who
benefit to pay a fee for services rendered operates as a penalty against a
disfavored group for the purpose of making group membership less
attractive. As Justice Kagan notes, the end result is that “[e]veryone – not
just those who oppose the union, but also those who back it – has an
economic incentive to withhold dues[48]
The Abood Court recognized that the “designation of a union as exclusive
representative carries with it great responsibilities” as well as significant
costs, and that fair share fees were a reasonable way to fairly distribute these
costs among all who benefit therefrom.[49] The majority opinion, however,
refuses to acknowledge the costs associated with such duties; and instead
focuses on the “many benefits” that come with exclusive representation, and
the “special privileges” that are granted to unions.[50] Clearly, the majority
purposefully ignores the economic realities of prohibiting fair share fees. As
Justice Kagan poignantly states:
[T]he majority again fails to reckon with how economically rational actors
behave . . . Without a fair-share agreement, the class of union non-members
spirals upward . . . [a]nd when the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are
that the union will lack the resources to effectively perform the
responsibilities of an exclusive representative–or, in the worst case, to
perform them at all.[51]

The likelihood that bargaining unit employees will choose not to become
union members is significant. After all, why would anyone pay for something
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they can get for free? The risk is that unions will be financially crippled, and
unable to afford to operate, rendering these special benefits and privileges
utterly meaningless.
The majority opinion represents a significant departure from the Court’s
long history of valuing democracy in the workplace. For the first time, the
rights of individuals are held in higher regard than the rights of the collective
majority. To reach this decision, the majority equates fair share fees with
requiring individuals to support the union. However, nothing could be
further from the truth. Non-members are free to voice whatever opinions
they choose, in any forum. No matter what opinions are voiced by those who
oppose them, the union’s obligations remain the same. Because employees
remain free to voice their opposition to the union, fair share fees do not
compel anyone to support the union or any positions it advances.
The majority also overlooks that the costs of fair share fees are minimal. The
petitioner’s annual fair share fees were a mere $535.[52] The cost of one
arbitration hearing alone often far exceeds $5,000. Thus, the requirement to
pay such minimal fees, especially when compared with the costs associated
with the duty of fair representation, hardly infringes on free speech rights.
Yet, the majority is of the opinion that “[d]esignating a union as the
employees’ exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of
individual employees” because individuals “may not be represented by any
agent other than the designated union; nor may individual employees
negotiate directly with their employer.”[53]
This argument is entirely misplaced, and completely incompatible with the
majority’s acknowledgement that exclusive representation comes with great
rights and privileges. The rights and privileges gained by unions are used
solely for the benefit of bargaining unit employees. The majority’s opinion
that exclusive representation restricts the rights of individuals is belied by
economic realities. In the absence of exclusive representation, where will
employees find someone to represent them in costly litigation for an annual
fee of $535? They cannot, which is why democracy in the workplace is so
vital. It gives bargaining unit employees a voice they otherwise do not have,
and access to litigation they otherwise cannot afford.
In an effort to resolve this dilemma, the majority claims that the burden of
exclusive representation imposed upon unions is inconsequential because
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“[i]ndividual nonmembers could be required to pay for that service or could
be denied union representation altogether,” citing to a single state law that
authorizes unions to charge religious objectors who use the grievance or
arbitration procedures for the reasonable costs associated with those
procedures.[54] Oddly, though, the majority also cites to Section 6(g) of the
IPLRA, which permits those who object to fair share fees for religious
reasons to pay the same amount to a non-religious charitable
organization.[55] However, the IPLRA is devoid of any requirement that
such individuals pay for costs associated with use of grievance
proceedings.[56] Nothing in the IPLRA permits unions to charge for costs
associated with the use of grievance proceedings. Instead, like many other
States, such a requirement can only be accomplished through legislative
measures. It is utterly inappropriate for the Court to justify overturning
long-standing precedent based on legislation that could be enacted.
Fair share fees result in minimal infringements on free speech rights. Such
minimal infringements clearly do not outweigh the burdens imposed upon
the government and unions so as to justify such a drastic departure from the
Court’s historical treatment of fair share fees.
B.

Fair Share Fees are Now the Exception to the Rules Concerning
Public Employee Speech

The historical deference given to public employers in managing their
workforce and regulating speech is not without limits. Rather, “[t]he
government . . . needs to show that legitimate workplace interests lay behind
the speech regulation.”[57] Thus, a two-part test arose out of three Supreme
Court decisions that form the basis for determining whether a public
employee’s speech is protected.[58] First, it must be determined whether the
individual spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.[59] If the
individual spoke as an employee on a workplace matter, there is no
constitutional protection, and the public employer is allowed to regulate the
speech.[60] However, if the individual spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, the second step of the analysis focuses on “whether the relevant
government entity had adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public.”[61]
The majority opinion dismisses Abood’s balancing protected speech and the
government’s interest in regulating its employees’ speech.[62] However, the
majority’s analysis is misplaced because it improperly focuses on the nature
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of the regulation (i.e. compelling support of the union), and whether the
speech impacts the government’s budget. This is a slippery slope because the
category of speech that could impact a government’s budget is vast. Taking
this argument to its logical conclusion means that even the most trivial
workplace concerns are matters of public concern simply because they
impact the budget. Carving out a new exception to long-established public
employee speech rules will only result in confusion and expose state and local
governments to increased litigation.
The majority recognizes that a state’s ability to require unions to fairly
represent all bargaining unit employees is “itself a significant impingement
on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts,” but
“draw[s] the line at allowing the government to go further still and require
all employees to support the union irrespective of whether they share its
views.”[63] Thus, the majority readily accepts limitations on associational
freedoms as applied to unions, but rejects limitations on public employee
speech rights as applied to individuals who oppose unions. This is especially
true where, as here, the limitations on public employee speech are intended
to balance the burden imposed by the duty of fair representation. The
majority’s theory is that fair share fees amount to “compelling” those
individuals to support union speech. It ignores Abood’s limitations on
chargeable expenses, and that bargaining unit employees remain free to
voice their opinions and opposition to the union, or the positions it advances.
One of the most significant hurdles to overturning Abood was the Court’s
long-standing belief that speech related to collective bargaining was not a
matter of public concern.[64] The majority now claims that “[w]hen a large
number of employees speak through their union, the category of speech that
is of public concern is greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that is of
only private concern is substantially shrunk.”[65] Citing the Illinois budget
problems, the majority views any demand from a public sector union that
impacts the employer’s budget as a matter of public concern.[66] Thus,
contrary to the Court’s historical treatment of collective bargaining, the
majority declared that speech related to collective bargaining “is
overwhelmingly of substantial public concern.”[67]
This raises more constitutional questions than it resolves. Almost every issue
raised by a union has the potential to impact the employer’s budget. Does
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this now mean that all issues raised by a union are matters of “substantial
public concern”? If so, that means such speech should be given greater, not
less, protection. Yet, it appears from the majority’s opinion that the intent is
to carve out an exception for a small minority of individuals who do not want
to be union members, while not affording the same status to the collective
interests of the bargaining unit. This is completely contrary to this country’s
system of collective bargaining, which necessarily “subordinates the interests
of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a
bargaining unit.”[68] There is simply no constitutional justification for
giving greater protection to those who oppose unions than those who support
them.
To fit this new framework, the majority distorts the test by focusing on
“whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government employee’s
speech.”[69] Importantly, this approach is fundamentally flawed because,
arguably, most issues raised by public sector unions impact the
governmental employer’s budget. “Instead, the question is whether that
speech is about and directed to the workplace–as contrasted with the
broader public square.”[70] Clearly, speech involving collective bargaining
is “intimately tied to the workplace and employment relationship.”[71] Such
speech occurs in the workplace, directly concerns the workplace, and is
addressed to the employer, thereby satisfying the Court’s well-established
standards for determining whether governmental limits on workplace
speech pass constitutional muster. “Abood allowed the government to
mandate fees for collective bargaining–just as Pickering permits the
government to regulate employees’ speech on similar workplace matters. . . .
Abood thus dovetailed with the Court’s usual attitude in First Amendment
cases toward the regulation of public employees’ speech.”[72]
As Justice Kagan notes, the balance struck in Abood gave great deference to
the government’s role as an employer, “[a]nd when the regulated expression
concerns the terms and conditions of employment–the very stuff of the
employment relationship–the government really cannot lose. . . . Except that
today the government does lose, in a first for the law.”[73] However, with
this decision, the government is not the only loser; we all lose when
democracy and free speech rights are threatened. By carving out exceptions
that apply only to those who oppose unions, the Court has indeed threatened
core democratic principles.
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Stare Decisis is Apparently Dead

After determining that fair share fees violate the First Amendment, the only
remaining hurdle the Janus Court faced was that of stare decisis. Stare
decisis is an important doctrine because it ensures consistent and
predictable outcomes, and preserves the integrity of the judicial process; the
importance of which even the majority cannot deny.[74] Although the
majority recognizes that the decision to overturn precedent should not be
made lightly, the Court justified overturning Abood on the basis that it was
incorrectly decided.[75] However, even if it were true that Abood was wrong,
“[r]especting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.” Any
departure from settled precedent (so the Court has often stated) demands a
“special justification – over and above the belief that the precedent was
wrongly decided.”[76]
Stare decisis is central to our system of jurisprudence because it means the
Court’s decisions are “founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals.”[77] Clearly, Janus was based on the individual anti-union
sentiments of the current majority.
The majority opinion faults the Abood Court for relying on Railway
Employees’ Dept. vs. Hanson,[78] and Machinists vs. Street,[79] two prior
cases involving agency shop arrangements in the private sector. The Court,
in Janus, finds that the “deferential standard” in those two cases “finds no
support in our free speech cases.”[80] The Court plainly ignores the fact that
“Abood is not just any precedent: It is embedded in the law . . . in a way not
many decisions are.”[81] Yet, the majority glosses over Abood’s impact, and
claims that “Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the
practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify
public-sector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . or
nonchargeable.”[82] The majority completely ignores the fact that, in the
forty-one year history of Abood, “this Court has had to resolve only a handful
of cases raising questions about the distinction” between chargeable and
non-chargeable expenses.[83]
In support of its argument that Abood is no longer workable, the majority
cites to the “daunting and expensive task” faced by fair share fee objectors
who “wish to challenge union chargeability determinations.”[84] The Court
fails to explain why this is a compelling factor, especially when it ignores the
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“daunting and expensive task” imposed upon unions by the duty of fair
representation. And, while there may be some gray areas requiring
clarification between chargeable and non-chargeable offenses, “everyone
knows the difference between politicking and collective bargaining.”[85]
Thus, the majority’s attempt to attack the workability of Abood is weak, at
best.
The majority circles back to the notion that the principles of exclusive
representation and fair share fees are mutually exclusive to support its
argument that Abood is “an outlier among our First Amendment cases.”[86]
The “developments” relied upon by the majority since issuance of Abood are
the “ascendance of public-sector unions [that] has been marked by a parallel
increase in public spending.”[87] However, even the majority cannot deny
that the increase in public spending cannot be attributed solely to public
sector unions.[88] More importantly, concerns over state and local
government spending, and the costs of public employee wages and benefits,
are policy matters that are best left to those governmental entities, as
opposed to the judicial branch. This is especially true where, as here, “Illinois
and many governmental amici have explained again how agency fees
advance their workplace goals.”[89]
Additionally, the majority compares agency fees to the political patronage
cases.[90] Simply stated, this argument makes no sense, and is another
example of gross overreaching by the majority. No bargaining unit employee,
regardless of membership status, is required to support a particular
politician, or political activity. Indeed, the entire purpose of fair share fees is
to prohibit unions from using non-members’ funds for political purposes and
activities. Yet, the majority views this decision as “bring[ing] a measure of
greater coherence to our First Amendment law.”[91] Nothing could be
further from the truth, as this decision accomplishes the exact opposite.
Finally, the majority finds reliance an insufficient reason to uphold Abood.
In support of this finding, the Court notes that “public-sector unions have
been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood.”[92]
The majority reasons that, “[d]uring this period of time, any public-sector
union seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective bargaining agreement
must have understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was
uncertain.”[93] Such an argument is preposterous. It ignores the long history
of Abood, and reasonable reliance on the principles of stare decisis. It also
ignores the thousands of collective bargaining relationships developed over
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decades between unions and employers; relationships that developed under
the framework of fair share fees. Removing fair share fees from the equation
will undoubtedly inject substantial discord into those relationships.
The majority also cites to the relatively short duration of public-sector
collective bargaining agreements, and claims that “the union was able to
protect itself if an agency-fee provision was essential to the overall bargain”
because it “could have insisted on a provision giving greater protection.”[94]
This argument is nonsensical, and the majority fails to explain what “greater
protection” could be negotiated. Apparently, the majority views severability
clauses as the answer.[95] Severability clauses commonly appear in
collective bargaining agreements, and protect the integrity of said
agreements by preserving the remaining portions of an agreement where one
portion is deemed invalid. However, such clauses have nothing to do with
securing adequate funding, and already appear in most, if not all, collective
bargaining agreements.
Moreover, the weakness of the majority viewpoint is underscored by its views
on the impact resulting from the loss of fair share fees. Recognizing that the
loss of fair share fees will cause “unions to experience unpleasant transition
costs in the short term,” the majority is of the opinion that it “may require
unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members.”[96]
Yet, because the duty of fair representation ties the union’s hands, few, if any,
adjustments can be made that will enable unions to effectively attract and
retain members. Thus, the majority’s inability to articulate how unions can
adjust for the loss of fair share fees is understandable because the unions’
hands are tied.
These illogical leaps underscore the majority’s desperation to fit a square peg
into a round hole. Indeed, this is most evident in the Court’s opinion
concerning “the considerable windfall that unions have received under
Abood for the past 41 years.”[97] Elaborating further, the majority finds that
“[i]t is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First
Amendment.”[98] Such findings make a mockery of our system of
jurisprudence. As Justice Kagan notes, stare decisis is strengthened by the
legislature’s and citizens’ reliance on Supreme Court precedent, and the
majority opinion “wreaks havoc on entrenched legislative and contractual
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arrangements” that arise in the context of a continuing relationship between
employers and unions.[99] More importantly, borrowing a quote from
Justice Scalia, Justice Kagan notes that “‘reliance upon a square,
unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable
reliance.’”[100]
Thus, notwithstanding the lack of exceptional circumstances or special
justifications for departing from stare decisis, the Court made clear its
willingness to legislate from the bench. As Justice Kagan so eloquently
stated:
The majority has overruled Abood for no exceptional or special reasons, but
because it never liked the decision. It has overruled Abood because it
wanted to. Because, that is, it wanted to pick the winning side in what
should be–and until now, has been–an energetic policy debate. . . . Today,
that healthy–that democratic–debate ends. The majority has adjudged who
should prevail. . . . And maybe most alarming, the majority has chosen the
winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against
workaday economic and regulatory policy. . . . The First Amendment was
meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect
democratic governance–including over the role of public-sector
unions.[101]

This decision is a slippery slope because it has the potential to “expos[e]
government entities across the country to increased First Amendment
litigation and liability.”[102] Indeed, this decision creates more
constitutional questions than it resolves, as union speech now has a new
constitutional status. However, the real test is yet to come. The Court will
be likely be required to address increased constitutional challenges in this
area of public employee speech. Only then will we see whether the Court is
willing to extend this new constitutional status to pro-union speech.
Moving forward, unions and state and local governments are faced with an
onerous task. The relationships built between public sector unions and state
and local governments have developed over the course of more than four
decades. The prohibition against fair share fees means that these parties will
have to re-write legislation and thousands of collective bargaining
agreements, and re-think labor relations in a climate of great uncertainty.
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III. LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MOVES INVOLVING JANUS
Janus is a major destabilizing event in what had been an area of law that was
well settled for the past forty years. The legal understanding since Abood had
been incorporated into twenty-plus public sector collective bargaining
statutes across the country. However, the Janus decision had been lurking
on the horizon since Justice Alito started lining up his legal dominos, and
significant preparation had been put in place prior to the decision by unions
on one side and the special interest third parties on the other. Since the Knox
decision and Justice Alito’s clearly telegraphed desire to take down public
sector collective bargaining, parties on both sides of the issue have been
preparing for the day this decision came down. With the appointment of
Justice Gorsuch to the Court, the decision issued by the Court on June 27,
2018 felt largely inevitable. Prior to the Court issuing its decision, legislative
as well as legal action had already been taken in anticipation of the Court’s
ruling. The following will examine the legal challenges and legislative
changes prompted by Janus’ predecessor cases and those that have emerged
since the decision issued.
A.

Legislative Actions

Several states passed legislation before the decision was issued, mostly
focusing on everything from union access to new employees to proper
periods for membership revocation as well as personal information
protection. California passed the most bills addressing the possible impacts
of Janus, but states from the West coast to the East coast acted to address
possible fallout from the decision. The following survey of legislation passed
in anticipation of Janus may suggest ways other states may handle the fallout
from the decision.
California was by far the most preemptively active state in passing legislation
to deal with the implications of the Court’s Janus decision, enacting four laws
to deal with the impact of the Court’s decision. Assembly Bill 119 was signed
into law by Governor Jerry Brown on June 27, 2017 and took effect
immediately. The legislature, in drafting and passing the legislation stated:
The Legislature finds and declares that the ability of an exclusive
representative to communicate with the public employees it represents is
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of state labor relations statutes, and
the exclusive representative cannot properly discharge its legal obligations
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unless it is able to meaningfully communicate through cost-effective and
efficient means with the public employees on whose behalf it acts. In most
cases, that communication includes an opportunity to discuss the rights and
obligations created by the contract and the role of the representative, and to
answer questions. That communication is necessary for harmonious public
employment relations and is a matter of statewide concern. Therefore, it is
the Legislature’s intent that recognized exclusive representatives of
California’s public employees be provided meaningful access to their
represented members as described in this chapter unless expressly
prohibited by law. [103]

The law adds Sections 3555 to 3559 to the California Government Code to
amend the California’s labor relations act. [104] The added sections
expanded the act’s coverage, making it applicable to cities, counties, special
districts, trial courts, state civil service agencies, the Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, public schools (K-12), community
colleges, California State Universities, Universities of California and school
districts.[105]
Assembly Bill 119 also amended the Section 6253.2 and 6254.3 of the
California Public Records Act. [106] Under the legislation, employers must
give ten days’ notice to the union of new hire orientations, and the law applies
to in person, online or through other means. The parties must bargain the
structure, time and manner of union access to new employee orientation.
Compulsory interest arbitration is required if the parties cannot reach an
agreement on orientation access, with the parties splitting the cost of such
arbitration. The parties may bargain an agreement that varies from the
provisions of the law, but in the absence of such an agreement, the
requirements of the law prevail. [107]
The other significant provision of Assembly Bill 119 concerns the information
that the public employer is required to supply to the exclusive bargaining
representative.[108] The law amended the California Public Records Act,
Sections 6253.2 and 6254.3 to require a covered public employer to provide
the name, job title, department, work location, work, home and personal cell
phone numbers, personal email address if on file with the employer and
home address of newly hired employees to the exclusive bargaining
representative within thirty days of the employee’s hire. The law also
requires that the employer provide this information for all employees to the
exclusive bargaining representative at least every 120 days.[109] The law
also exempts personal email addresses from public inspection unless the
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personal email address is used by the employee to conduct public business
or is necessary to identify an otherwise disclosable communication. [110]
California also passed Senate Bill 846, which was signed by the Governor on
September 14, 2018 and became effective immediately. [111] California law
had previously provided for the collection of agency fees under the Ralph C.
Dills Act and the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. Senate Bill 846 recognized that
those statutory provisions were voided by the Janus decision, but addressed
the possible liability of public employers and unions for having collected
agency fees in the past. [112] Senate Bill 846 prohibits the state Controller,
public employers, and employee organization, or any of their employees or
agents from being liable under state law for collecting, deducting, receiving
or retaining any agency fees collected under California Law.[113] The law
grants complete immunity to any state law claims and denies standing to any
current or former public employee for any fees properly collected under
California law prior to June 27, 2018.[114] The law applies to any currently
pending claims at the time of signing, as well as claims filed on or after that
date.[115] The California legislature found the law “necessary to provide
certainty to public employers and employee organizations that relied on state
law, and to avoid disruption of public employee labor relations, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Janus . . .”[116]
California Senate Bill 285 prohibits an employer deterring or discouraging
employees becoming or remaining members of a union.[117] California law
had previously prohibited state funds from being used to reimburse a state
contractor for any costs incurred to assist, promote or deter union
organizing, and prohibited public employers from receiving money from the
state to make any such payments. The new law filled the gap and added the
prohibition of using states funds to pay for efforts to encourage members to
leave the union after the Janus decision. The bill also clarified the definition
of public employer in this instance to apply to “counties, cities, districts, the
state, schools, transit districts, the University of California, and the
California State University, among others.”[118]
While California was the most prolific state in enacting legislation in
preparation for the Janus decision, it was not the only state to do so. For
example, Delaware enacted House Bill 314.[119] Delaware HB 314 took a
different approach from California, establishing a clear procedure and time
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frame by which public employees may revoke their membership from a
public employee union. [120] HB 314 passed the Delaware House on April
19, 2018 on more or less a party line vote. [121] It passed the Senate on May
5, 2018, with three Republicans joining the Democrats to vote yes, and it was
signed by the Governor the next day.[122]
HB 314 amended Delaware’s Public Employment Relations Act Section 1304
to provide that an employee may choose to continue to pay a fair share fee as
may be provided for in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). [123] If no
valid process exists in the CBA, then an employee, by written authorization,
may revoke his or her membership under the terms of the original
authorization that the employee signed, so long as the authorization
contained at least one revocation period. If the original authorization
contained no revocation period, then a request can be made to the exclusive
bargaining representative.[124]
Delaware HB 314 also established timelines for when revocation may occur
and when it becomes effective.[125] According to the language of the
enactment, if an original authorization does not specify when a revocation
becomes effective, the revocation will only become effective on the
employee’s anniversary date. [126] The statute provides that if the revocation
period is not provided by the original authorization, the revocation period
shall be “during the period 15 to 30 days before the employee’s anniversary
date of employment, effective on the employee’s anniversary date.” [127]
Maryland also took legislative action to address implications of the Janus
decision. The Maryland legislature put forth House Bill 811, cross -filed with
Senate Bill 819.[128] The bills passed the Senate on March 26, 2018 and the
House on the next day. Despite lacking the governor’s signature, the bill
became law under the provisions of Article II, Section 17 of the Maryland
Constitution after the governor failed to return objections to the General
Assembly within six days while the General Assembly was in session. [129]
Maryland HB 811/SB 819 requires certain public school employers, namely
any county board of education or the Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners, to provide an exclusive bargaining representative with
access to newly hired employees, and largely tracks with the California
legislation on the same issue.[130] The exclusive bargaining representative
must be provided at least ten days’ notice of new employee processing when
the representative will be allowed access. Like the California law, the
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Maryland law requires that the structure, time and manner of the access to
the new hires is determined through negotiations between the employer and
the exclusive representative.
By default a request to bargain access to new hires made between July 1, 2018
and the expiration of the parties’ contract reopens the contract only for the
purpose of establishing the time, manner and structure of access.[131] However, the parties are free to agree to a separate agreement, such as a side letter
or memorandum of understanding, instead of reopening the contract. [132]
The parties have 45 days after the first meeting or 60 days after the initial
request to negotiate to resolve any dispute over the structure, time and
manner of access. [133] After that point, either party may request the Public
School Labor Relations Board to declare impasse and trigger the impasse
procedures already contained in state statute. [134]
Maryland’s legislation provides the standard by which the Public School
Labor Relations Board should consider the matter before it.[135] The Public
School Labor Relations Board is instructed to consider the ability of the
exclusive representative to communicate with the employees it represents,
the legal obligations of the exclusive bargaining representative, applicable
state, local and federal laws, any stipulations of the parties, the financial
condition of the public schools and the interests and welfare of the
employees, access provided in comparable public school communities, and
“other facts routinely considered in establishing” such access.[136]
Similarly to the California statute, Maryland House Bill 811 requires that the
public school employer provide certain information to the exclusive
bargaining representative by amending Section 6-407.2 of Maryland’s
Education statute. [137] Under the amendment, the public school employer
must provide the exclusive bargaining representative, within 30 days of the
date of hire for a new employee, the new employee’s name, position
classification, home and work address, home and work telephone number,
personal cell phone number, and work email address. This requirement
attaches with all new hires, regardless of whether the newly hired employee
had been previously employed by the public school employer. There is no
requirement to provide personal email addresses. The public school
employer must provide the same information for current employees once
every 120 days. [138]
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Maryland passed an almost identical bill, HB 1017/SB 677, which addressed
exclusive bargaining representative access to newly hired state employees,
including those of the public colleges and universities, and the right of the
exclusive bargaining representatives to information about those
employees.[139] The minor differences are that the exclusive representative
has the right request information from the Department of Budget and
Management once every 120 days.[140] The Department of Budget and
Management and the exclusive bargaining representative may negotiate a
more frequent basis to provide the information, and the parties may
negotiate more detailed information to be provided than what is listed in the
statute. The information must also be presented to the exclusive bargaining
representative in a “searchable and analyzable electronic format.”[141]
The bill removes a prior prohibition on an exclusive representative, or an
authorized third party on its behalf, to use the information it receives for the
purpose of maintaining or increasing employee membership in a union.[142]
Previously, the exclusive bargaining representative had been prohibited
from using information provided by the employer for the purpose of
increasing employee membership. The enactment further provides that on
the written request of an employee, an exclusive bargaining representative
shall “withhold further communication with an employee unless otherwise
required by law or written request is revoked by the employee.”[143] While
this in some way limits the exclusive bargaining representative’s ability to
use the information, the limitation is balanced by the exclusive bargaining
representative now being expressly permitted to use the employee
information it receives from the employer to maintain or increase employee
membership.
Washington, like California and Maryland, codified an exclusive bargain
representative’s access to new employees at employee orientation. Senate
Bill 6229 passed the Washington State Senate on February 27, 2018, and the
Washington State House on February 27, 2018. It was signed into law by the
governor on March 23, 2018.[144]
The Bill created several new sections of statute in Washington’s public
employees’ collective bargaining statute. The most signification change was
an addition to Washington state statute Chapter 41.56.[145] That addition
requires the employer to give the union reasonable access to new employees
“for the purpose of presenting information about their exclusive bargaining
representative.”[146] The legislature defined reasonable access as occurring
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within 90 days and for no less than 30 minutes, and must occur during the
employee’s regular working hours.[147] However, the employer and union
may agree to longer or more frequent access than is provided for in the
statute.[148] The presentation should occur during the new employee’s
orientation, unless the employer and union have negotiated another
arrangement. However, no employee is required to attend the meeting with
the exclusive bargaining representative.[149]. The act applies to community
colleges, school district employees, faculty at public four year colleges and
universities, employees of the state of Washington, county or municipal
corporation, or any political subdivision of the state of Washington,
including district courts and superior courts, ferry employees, and symphony
musicians.[150]
New Jersey also passed legislation anticipating Janus and its potential
impact on public sector collective bargaining. The New Jersey Assembly
passed, and the governor signed, the “Workplace Democracy Enhancement
Act,” which became effective on May 18, 2018.[151] Like California,
Maryland and Washington, New Jersey codified an exclusive bargaining
representative’s right of access to newly hired employees.[152] Access to
newly hired employees must be provided within 30 calendar days of the date
of hire, last for at least 30 minutes but not more than 120 minutes, and be
conducted without effect on the employee’s pay or leave time.[153] Access is
provided at new employee orientation, or if no orientation is conducted, in
individual or group meetings.[154]
The act requires access to current bargaining unit members as well. A public
employer must provide access to the work place.[155] Access under the
statute includes the right to meet with individual employees during the work
day to investigate and discuss grievances, as well as workplace-related
complaints and other workplace issues.[156] The Act also provides that
exclusive bargaining representatives will have access to the workplace to
hold meetings during employees’ lunch, breaks and before and after shifts to
discuss workplace related issues, such as contract negotiations or
enforcement, as well as meetings about internal union matters such as
governance or other internal business matters. Exclusive bargaining
representatives are also permitted to use, subject to possibly paying for
maintenance, security and other costs if applicable, government owned or
leased buildings to conduct meetings with bargaining unit members, so long
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as those meetings to do not interfere with government operations or involve
any form of campaigning for any partisan political office.[157]
The Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act requires the public employer,
within ten days of hire of a new employee, provide to the exclusive bargaining
representative contact information for the employee, including name, job
title, date of hire, worksite, home address, work telephone numbers and any
home or cell phone numbers on file with the employer, work email address
and personal email address if it is on file with the employer.[158] The act
mandates that the information be presented in Excel format or a format
mutually agreed to by the parties.[159] Exclusive bargaining representatives
have the right to use the employer’s email system to communicate with
bargaining unit members, as well.[160] Employee information such as home
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, and negotiation
units and groupings of employees, and the emails or other communications
between employee organizations and their members, prospective members,
and non-members are not considered government records, and, therefore,
are exempt from the state’s Open Public Records Act.[161]
The act penalizes public employers for encouraging bargaining unit
members to revoke their membership in the exclusive bargaining
representative, and for discouraging employees from joining, forming or
assisting an employee organization.[162] Engaging in any of the prohibited
acts is an unfair labor practice and, upon finding that the violation occurred,
the Public Employee Relations Commission is required to order the exclusive
bargaining unit representative be made whole for any losses suffered from
the public employer’s violations, among any other remedial relief.[163].
The Act also restricts the time period that employees can withdraw from
membership in the exclusive bargaining representative organization.[164]
Employees who wish to revoke their authorizations for dues deductions may
do so by written notice to the employer during the ten days following each
anniversary date of their employment.[165] The withdrawal becomes
effective on the thirtieth day after the employee’s anniversary date.[166]
Within five days of the receipt of the written request, the public employer
must provide notice to the exclusive bargaining representative of the
withdrawal of authorization.[167] However, the legislation allows the pubic
employer and exclusive bargaining representative to agree that requests for
withdrawal of authorization must go through the exclusive bargaining
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representative and establish the effective date of revocation as the July 1st
following the date on which the notice was filed.[168]
New York also enacted legislation granting exclusive bargaining
representatives access to new employees. New York passed the protections
in section RRR of its revenue bill in April of 2018.[169] The legislation
provides, much like the previously discussed states, that a public employer
must give notice to the exclusive bargaining representative within 30 days of
making a new hire and inform the representative of the employee’s name,
address, job title, employing agency, department and work location. Within
30 days of providing the notice, employer must give the representative a
reasonable amount of time during the employee’s work time to meet with the
employee.[170]
Unlike the other states, New York’s legislation exempts all public employee
exclusive bargaining representative organizations from being required to
provide services and representation to non-member employees.[171] The
legislation specifically does not require a union to provide representation to
a non-member when he or she is being questioned by the employer, in
statutory or administrative proceedings over statutory or administrative
rights, in any stage of the grievance, arbitration or other contractual process
dealing with assessing discipline so long as the non-member is permitted to
proceed without the union and allowed to retain his or her own
advocate.[172] The legislation specifically permits the union to restrict
providing representation in certain administrative and employer based
proceedings to union members only, with no threat of an unfair labor
practice charge for not representing members.[173]
Although New York’s is the broadest exemption from representation of nonmembers to be passed in anticipation of Janus, it is not unique in the nation.
Florida, the first state to pass a right to work statute in 1943 and
constitutional amendment in 1968, has had a statutory provision since 1977
which provides that unions may refuse to represent non-members.[174] The
provision has gone without direct legal challenge since its passage and is a
clear indicator that such statutory provisions should be legally viable.
The New York governor also issued an executive order protecting state
workers’ information from being given to third parties. Executive Order 183
was signed by the governor on June 27, 2018, the day that the Janus decision
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issued.[175] The executive order states that workers’ home addresses and cell
phone numbers are “being used to attack, harass, and intimidate them.”[176]
It further stated that New York State would not permit its public sector
workers’ private information to be “abused” “as part of a campaign to harass
and intimidate workers for any reason, including engaging in union activities
or looking to unionize.”[177] The executive order prohibits any state entity,
its officers or employees from disclosing the home address, personal
telephone numbers, cell phone numbers, and email addresses of a public
employee except to a union who represents the employee, a union seeking to
represent the employee and if legally compelled to do so.[178]
Traveling to the farthest west state in the Union, Hawaii passed legislation
to establish the process by which public employees may revoke their
membership in a union.[179] The Hawaii legislation requires that an
employee provide written notice to the union to revoke payroll
deductions.[180] The written revocation must be delivered to the union
within 30 days before the employee’s anniversary date.[181] The union then
has ten business days to inform the employer of the employee’s revocation of
deductions.[182]
Rhode Island took a legislative approach similar to New York’s in relation to
representation requirements for non-member employees. Senate Bill 2158
Substitute A, which applied only to police and fire units in the state,[183]
exempts police and fire unions from representing employees in any level of
the grievance process, including arbitration, when the employees have
elected to not become members of the union or when they revoke their
membership status.[184] Non-member employees may proceed through the
grievance process at their own cost, but the union must have the opportunity
to be present at any hearing.[185] Furthermore, the resolution of the
grievance must be consistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.[186] The legislation makes clear that a union has no obligation
to incur any expenses in relation to an employee who has not been a member
of the union for at least ninety days prior to the events giving rise to the
grievance.[187]
In contrast to the above-discussed legislative actions, public employee union
detractors have proposed legislation in various states that has been drafted
by groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). In
Pennsylvania for example, legislation was proposed which would have
amended Pennsylvania’s public sector bargaining law to define a
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nonmember and provide for “independent bargaining,” the direct bargaining
between a public employee and public employer without a collective
bargaining representative.[188] It would protect against discrimination in
terms of benefits and pay against an employee engaged in independent
bargaining.[189]. It would also require the public employer, on an annual
basis, to notify all public employees in a bargaining unit that “there is no
statutory obligation by nonmembers to make any payments” to the union
that represents the bargaining unit.[190] The bill would require that
employees be informed that they are not required to make any payments to
the union unless they affirmatively assent, and that payment is not necessary
to maintain employment.[191] The legislation would also permit employees
to revoke their membership at any time in writing and would prohibit the
union and employer establishing in the collective bargaining agreement any
procedure for rescinding membership.[192] The bill, however, did not made
it out of the Labor and Industry Committee.[193]
The legislation that did not pass in Pennsylvania is similar to draft legislation
that ALEC has provided. According to ALEC, the purposes of its proposed
“Public Employee Bargaining Transparency Act,” (“PEBTA”) is to “avoid
having public employees misled into forfeiting free speech rights and
suffering financial loss.”[194] According to the model legislation, any
authorization signed before June 27, 2018 would no longer be valid, and new
authorizations must be freely given and shown by clear and convincing
evidence.[195] Under the model legislation, employees may revoke their
affirmative authorizations at any time, in writing, and such right to
revocation can never be waived.[196] Under PEBTA, an employee’s
employment or continued employment cannot be conditioned on payment
to any charity or third party in the amount equivalent to dues or fees charged
by a labor union, dues or fees to the union.[197]
The model legislation goes so far as to include the text of the affirmative
waiver required to allow deductions from an employee’s paycheck for dues
or fees. The text reads:
I recognize that I have a First Amendment right to associate. My rights
provide that I am not compelled to pay a labor organization as a condition
of employment, and I do not have to sign this waiver. However, I am hereby
waiving my right to free speech and affirmatively consent to allow my

30 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

WINTER 2019

employer to deduct payments to a labor organization until such time as I
choose to revoke this authorization.[198]

The above notice would be required to be in bold and all caps in font equal
to or larger than any other font on the document, and shall be a standalone
document presented to the employee.[199] The model legislation also
provides that any person suffering injury, real or threatened, resulting from
violation of the statute has the right to filing a civil action for damages and
injunctive relief, as well as mandatory cost shifting for a prevailing
plaintiff.[200]
B.

Legal Challenges

The legislative front is not the only venue in which reactions and pre-emptive
actions have been taken regarding Janus. The courts have seen lawsuits filed
both in anticipation of and reaction to the Court’s decision. At least 13 states
have pending cases and range from Alaska to Maine. Some of the cases, such
as those dealing with opt-out windows and member incentives, may have
significant impacts on the legislation discussed above. This section of the
paper will look at some of the pending litigation that has been spurned by
Janus.
Some cases brought are attempting to collect retroactively for fees collected
before the Janus decision issued. Cases on the subject have been filed in
Washington[201] and Minnesota.[202] Generally, in these cases the
plaintiffs are seeking injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. There has
been ongoing debate since the Janus decision issued as to whether these
cases would be successful. Those who say unions can be liable for pre-Janus
fees fall under a three step analysis. First, they assert that the decision is
understood to be a statement by the Supreme Court of the law as it has always
been, not a change in the law. Second, unions can be sued as private actors
under Section 1983 because they used state power to collect the money. And
third, unions do not have qualified immunity that is available to governments in 1983 cases.[203] Those who do not believe that unions can be sued
for fees collected before Janus respond by arguing that the unions acted in
good faith when they collected the fees pre-Janus and did not know or could
not have known that the state laws under which they operated were unconstitutional.[204] Only one case, Danielson v. AFSCME Council 28, [205] has
been decided in this post Janus world.
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In Danielson, the plaintiffs filed suit as State of Washington employees who
objected to forced union membership and did not want to pay agency
fees.[206] The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgement that the imposition
of agency fees violated the First Amendment, injunctive relief prohibiting the
collection of such fees, monetary relief for agency fees wrongly collected, and
attorney’s fees and expenses. [207] The court had previously dismissed the
same claims made against Washington State as moot, because the state had
voluntarily stopped deducting agency fees after the Janus decision, and there
was no reasonable expectation that Washington State would begin collecting
them again.[208] AFSCME Council 28 filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment on similar grounds. The U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington quickly dismissed the claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief as moot, as there was little likelihood that
the state or union would begin collecting agency fees again.[209]
On the issue of monetary relief, the union argued that the defense of good
faith applied.[210]. The defendants cited Wyatt v. Cole[211] as the basis of
their good faith argument. In that case, the appeals court found that a
defendant may be held liable for a violation of Section 1983 only if it failed to
act in good faith in applying the unconstitutional state procedure.[212]
Failing to act in good faith, as defined by the Wyatt Court depended on
whether the defendant knew or should have known that the statute the action
was based on was unconstitutional.[213]
In the Daniels case, the defendant argued that no monetary damages should
be awarded because it was acting under good faith when it collected fair share
fees according to the state laws in effect at the time, which were
presumptively valid until the Janus decision.[214] Plaintiffs argued that the
good faith defense should not apply because the most closely related
common law tort, conversion, would not have conferred a similar immunity
at the time that Section 1983 was enacted.[215] The plaintiffs further argued
that even if the good faith immunity did apply, the defendant had made no
showing of a subjective state of mind.[216]
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the good faith immunity does
not apply as the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the defense and several
circuit courts have relied upon it.[217] While the court acknowledged that
the exact contours of the defense have never been clearly defined the defense
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is based upon equity and fairness, and the court adapted the Fifth Circuit’s
test from Wyatt as the standard to apply.[218] The court stated that the
defense was clearly applicable in this case as the defendant could not have
known, until the Janus decision was issued, that collecting agency fees was
unconstitutional.[219] After Janus was issued, the defendant immediately
ceased collecting agency fees in compliance with the Court’s ruling and
abandonment of fifty-year legal precedent.[220]
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the court must analogize
plaintiffs’ claim to a state common law claim, in this case conversion.[221]
The court found that the plaintiffs’ argument lacked precedent in the Ninth
Circuit.[222] Even if the court were required to compare an analogous
common law, the court found that the plaintiffs were incorrect in arguing
that conversion was analogous.[223] The court agreed with the defendant’s
astute observation that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm was not the defendant’s
receipt of the moneys, but the “dignitary harm resulting from being
compelled to support speech with which they disagreed.”[224] Therefore
defamation or tortious interference with contract would be more appropriate
comparators.[225]
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant had the
burden to show its state of mind and that plaintiffs should be entitled to
discovery on that issue.[226] The court found that while the good faith
defense usually requires showing a subjective state of mind, application of
that requirement in this case would lead to “a perverse outcome.”[227] In
this case, the court stated the outcome would turn on the subjective belief of
an employee of the union and “[a]ny subjective belief [the union] could have
had that the precedent was wrongly decided and should be overturned would
have amounted to telepathy.”[228] Even though overruling Abood had been
hinted at in the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, the defendant should not
be expected to have known that Abood was unconstitutional.[229]
Expecting the defendant to have predicted the outcome of Janus
“undermines the importance of observing existing precedent and ignores the
possibility that prevailing jurisprudential winds may shift. This is not a
practical, sustainable or desirable model.”[230] The court held that the good
faith defense applied as a matter of law and shielded the defendant from
liability for collecting pre-Janus agency fees and dismissed the case.[231]
While this is the first case of its kind to be decided post Janus it is far from
the only case. A California case, Wilford v. NEA, was filed in July as a class
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action with seven California teachers currently named as plaintiffs, at least
four of whom were also plaintiffs in the Friedrichs case.[232] The complaint
was filed to preserve the class members’ ability “to seek retrospective relief
against the defendants as far back as the applicable statute of limitations will
allow.”[233] The complaint alleges violations of Section 1983, conversion,
and restitution of money had and received.[234] The suit is seeking class
certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as reimbursement of
all service or agency fees along with pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest, damages and attorney fees under Section 1983.[235] Currently, this
case is still in scheduling conference.
As of 2018, there were more than 25 pending lawsuits regarding retroactive
application of Janus and collection of past fees. One such case, Hoekman v.
Education Minnesota, seeks to recover past collected dues for members and
non-members alike, forming a sort of hybrid of the legal issues discussed
above.[236] Needless to say, this will be a hot bed of litigation for a while
after Janus, as Justice Alito seemed to go out of his way to encourage claims
for retroactive relief because the Court’s overruling of Abood was
foreseeable.[237] Should the lower courts continue to rule as the Eastern
District of Washington did in Daniels, it is inconceivable that the cases will
not be taken up on appeal considering Justice Alito’s language.
The issue of class action status for non-members seeking to apply Janus
retroactively has already been before the Supreme Court. After the Supreme
Court’s Harris v. Quinn[238] holding that involuntary deduction of fair
share fees for home health care assistants violated the First Amendment,
Riffey v. Rauner[239] was filed on behalf of a class of home health care
assistants. The Riffey plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all non-union
member home health care assistants.[240]. The district court had denied
class certification, finding the class to be overly broad, the named plaintiffs
could not adequately represent the class, and individual questions regarding
damages predominated over common ones.[241] The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit found that the proposed class contained a significant
number of people whose First Amendment rights had not been violated, as
65 percent of the assistants had gone on to join the union.[242] It also agreed
with the district court’s finding that there were serious intra-class conflicts
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and that the named plaintiffs could not fairly and adequately represent all
prospective members.[243] The court agreed with the district court’s finding
that the common questions did not predominate over questions affecting
individual members in terms of determining who was owed what damages in
the case.[244]
The Supreme Court granted the plaitniffs’ petition for writ of certiorari and
vacated and remanded the issue in light of its Janus decision.[245] On
December 6, 2018, the Seventh Circuit again found that class certification
was not appropriate.[246] The court stated that Janus had no impact on its
decision because the status of the individuals in Riffey had already been
decided in Harris, in terms of their First Amendment rights in relation to
paying a fair share fee.[247] Therefore, “Janus simply did not affect whatever
remaining class claims the putative class members in” Riffey might
have.[248] It is inevitable that more class certification issues regarding
Janus will come up, but Riffey may provide a good insight into how those
arguments will play out.
Another issue in pending litigation is whether union members are bound by
the dues deduction contracts they signed before Janus. Ruling on cases in
this area will have a large impact on much of the legislation that had been
passed by states prior to Janus discussed above. One decision has been
issued on the topic, Smith v. Superior Court, County of Contra Costa.[249]
The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin defendants from continuing
to deduct membership dues from his paycheck.[250]
In Smith, the plaintiff, represented by the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation, sought a preliminary injunction against his employer,
the Superior Court of Contra Costa County and his union, AFSCME Local
2700.[251] Smith became a voluntary member of AFSCME Local 2700 on
January 4, 2016, and signed a year-long contract with Local 2700 to pay
dues. [252] The agreement to pay was not revocable except at the end of that
first year or when the memorandum of understanding between the employer
and the union expired.[253] Smith specifically consented to continue his
dues deduction through the expiration of the memorandum of
understanding, even if he resigned from the union.[254] The court found
that Smith could not use the First Amendment to abandon his contractual
duties.[255] The court quoted Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., for the rule that
“the First Amendment does not confer . . . a constitutional right to disregard
promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.”[256]
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The court also found that Janus did not give the plaintiff the ability to get out
of his contract with his union.[257] The court stated that the Janus decision
applied to non-members who had opted out of union membership, and
therefore could not be compelled to pay agency fees. It reasoned:
Smith wants Janus to stand for the proposition that any union member can
change his mind at the drop of a hat, invoke the First Amendment, and
renege on contractual obligation to pay dues. Far from acknowledging that
proposition, Janus actually acknowledges in its concluding paragraph that
employees can waive their First Amendment rights by affirmatively
consenting to pay union dues.[258]

The plaintiff argued that he could not have “knowingly” consented to pay
dues before Janus because he could not have known or understood the rights
the case would inform him that he had.[259] The court rejected this
argument because the plaintiff’s right to opt out of the union had been
clarified in Abood, and he affirmatively waived that right by agreeing to be a
dues paying member of his union.[260]
The court also held that the plaintiff could not show irreparable harm
required for a preliminary injunction because the defendant union had
placed all of Smith’s dues collected after he resigned into an escrow
account.[261] Because the money was sitting in escrow, not only would it be
available to Smith should he prevail, but it also could not be used to subsidize
anything that could be considered compelled speech, which was the First
Amendment right at the heart of Janus.[262] The court further noted that
the plaintiff had failed to show that the opt-out form did not provide a way
for him to stop his dues deductions. While the plaintiff called the
authorization card “coercive” and “self-serving” the court was having none of
it. It found that the authorization card was “a discretionary offer by Local
2700 to amend the terms of the dues-deduction agreement before the
contract requires the Union to do so.”[263] The court dismissed the motion
to enjoin the union.[264]
A similar case has been filed in Pennsylvania involving a bus driver who was
a union member and chose to resign his membership after Janus.[265] The
plaintiff in Mayer v. Wallingford – Swarthmore School District, like the
plaintiff in Smith, is represented by the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation. The claim in Mayer is similar to that in Smith, although
the rejection of the plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw from the union was based
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on a statutory requirement that withdrawal from the union happen in the
fifteen days before a collective bargaining agreement expires, which was
included in the employer and union’s collective bargaining agreement. Both
defendants in the case have motions to dismiss the first amended complaint
pending as of this writing.
On November 13, 2018, the New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations
Board, in AFSCME Local 3277 v. City of Rio Rancho, delivered its opinion
regarding the employer’s withholding of union members’ dues deductions
after Janus.[266]
The union filed for injunctive relief with the state labor board when the city
refused to collect and distribute the dues of union members after the Janus
decision.[267] Injunctive relief was granted by the general counsel and the
city appealed to the Board.[268] On appeal, the union further argued that as
member dues are required by statute to be deducted from a union member’s
paycheck until the member revokes according to the procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement, the city was also in violation of the parties’
CBA.[269] The city argued that the proper interpretation of Janus applied
to current union members as well as non-members, and therefore a clear and
affirmative consent for deductions is required so it was unclear if the original
dues deduction consents were valid.[270] After oral arguments were held,
the board found that the city’s withholding of dues deductions from current
union members may exceed what is required under the Janus decision.
Based on that finding, the board found the general counsel’s preliminary
injunction to be justified.[271]
An important developing area concerns challenges to exclusive
representation. In July, the Buckeye Institute, a conservative advocacy group
in Ohio with links to the National Right To Work Legal Foundation, brought
a suit in Minnesota on behalf of Kathleen Uradnik against the Inter Faculty
organization, St. Cloud State University and the Board of Trustees of the
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities.[272] The complaint sought a
preliminary injunction, alleging that the Inter Faculty Organization violates
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when it speaks on her behalf.[273]
Plaintiff is not a member of the union.[274] The district court, on September
27, 2018, denied the plaintiff’s motion, stating that Supreme Court and Eight
Circuit precedent have already rejected her arguments, and that even if
exclusive representation rose to a First Amendment violation, the state
statute would survive strict scrutiny.[275]
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While the plaintiff in Uradnik relied heavily on Janus, the district court
rejected this argument.[276] The court stated that the Supreme Court’s
decision addressed mandatory fees paid by non-union members, not
exclusive representation, and that the Supreme Court in its opinion noted
that it was “not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as
exclusive bargaining agent for its employees.”[277] The district court also
noted that the Eighth Circuit had also distinguished Minnesota’s public
sector bargaining law from that in Illinois, and stated that the Janus ruling
did not invalidate the Minnesota statute.[278]
The day after the district court’s decision, plaintiff appealed to the Eight
Circuit. On December 3, 2018, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, finding that the plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the
merits.[279] The next day, December 4, 2018, Uradnik filed a petition for
certiorai in the Supreme Court.[280] A Supreme Court decision in this case
could reshape the public sector labor law landscape in ways that the Janus
decision only hinted at. Should cert be granted in this case, it will be the case
to watch.
IV. CONCLUSION
What can be seen from the decisions that have come out thus far is that
courts and the one labor board that have looked at the issue, are narrowly
construing the holding in Janus to apply to fair share fee payers only. While
the sample size is small, thus far courts and administrative agencies are
unwilling to read Janus as applying to current union members, or see Janus’
holding as in any way changing the rights that were available to the
individual when he or she willing became a union member.
While the decision may be known in the Janus case, its impact is far from
clear. While many states passed preemptive legislation, how effective that
legislation will be depends greatly on how the cases currently pending in
courts across the country are decided. At this point, public sector labor can
look forward to several years of legal uncertainty and busy legislatures, if the
lead up to and immediate aftermath of Janus are any indication.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes, the
equal employment opportunity laws, and the First Amendment.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Managerial Employees

In Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union, 35 PERI ¶ 109
(IELRB 2018), the IELRB affirmed the administrative law judge’s
recommended decision that College and Career Specialists in the Chicago
Public Schools are not managerial employees. The union filed a majority
interest petition to classify College and Career Specialist as an “educational
employee” under the current collective bargaining agreement. The Chicago
Board of Education claimed that these employees fall under the managerial
exclusion, but the ALJ dismissed this defense.
College and Career Specialists are part of the Office of College and Career
Success in the Chicago Public Schools. The employees in this position are
tasked with “improving college enrollment and persistence, and then move
students into the workforce.” The ALJ found that this position's primary
function was strategic planning. The specialists work with management to
submit recommendations to senior leadership on the school’s postsecondary goals. There was nothing in the record showing that employees in
this position would ever create procedures without first speaking with
management. This position did not act as the leader for each school’s postsecondary team; rather, the position acted as a team member to facilitate
discussion. Further, they made no budgetary decisions.
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The IELRB began its analysis with the definition of a managerial employee
under Section 2(o) of the IELRA: “An individual who is engaged
predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with
the responsibility of directing the effectuation of such management policies
and practices.” The IELRB stated that the College and Career Specialists did
not perform executive or management functions because they: did not run
the department, agency, or program; did not make recommendations
independently; did not create goals for improving student post-secondary
enrollment; and were merely advisory. Further, the position's role with side
organizations was merely to provide information to the post-secondary team
rather than lead that function. Finally, they lacked the power to control their
budget. The IELRB further explained that even if the specialists did possess
executive or management functions in their job, it was not their dominant
function. Therefore, the position was entitled to representation under the
IELRA
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Retaliation

In Bowers and City of Chicago (Finance Department), No. L-CA-18-060
(ILRB Local Panel 2019),the ILRB Local Panel held that the charging party’s
evidence failed to support her claim that the City discharged her in
retaliation for filing a previous unfair labor practice charge against the City,
and for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance.
On September 22, 2016, Lachelle Bowers filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the City alleging that the City had discriminated and taken frivolous
disciplinary action against her. The record from this first charge
demonstrated that Bowers had an extensive disciplinary history including
insubordination, disrespectful and unprofessional behavior towards
coworkers and supervisors, written and oral reprimands, and numerous
suspensions. This charge was dismissed; however, it led to her second charge
against the City.
On May 21, 2018, Bowers filed an unfair labor practice charge against the
City alleging that the City violated Sections 10(a)(1) and (2) of the IPLRA
when it discharged her in retaliation for filing her first unfair labor practice
charge city in 2016, and for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance.
The Executive Director dismissed this charge on the ground that Bowers
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failed to provide adequate evidence to raise any issue of fact or law that would
warrant a hearing. Bowers appealed.
The Local Panel found Bowers’ appeal meritless. The ILRB held that the
Executive Director correctly decided that Bowers’ evidence failed to indicate
a nexus between her protected activity and her discharge. The ILRB agreed
with the Executive Director that timing alone was not enough to establish the
requisite causal connection that the City discharged Bowers in retaliation for
having previously filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city, and
for serving as a witness for the Union in a grievance.
Lastly, Bowers argued that “numerous material errors” led the Executive
Director to erroneously dismiss her case. The ILRB held that Bowers failed
to identify any such material errors or flaws in the Executive Director’s
analyses, findings of fact, or conclusions. Accordingly, the ILRB affirmed the
Executive Director’s dismissal of Bowers’ unfair labor practice charge against
the City.
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS
B.

Age Discrimination

In Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018), the United
States Supreme Court held that states and their political subdivisions are
“employers” covered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
regardless of whether they have at least 20 employees. In reaching this
decision, the Court interpreted “also means” in the ADEA’s definition of
employer as additive rather than merely clarifying the meaning of employer.
Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, laid off its
two oldest full-time firefighters because of a budget shortfall. The laid off
firefighters sued the Fire District alleging that their terminations violated the
ADEA. Staffed with fewer than 20 employees, the District moved to dismiss
the firefighters’ suit on the ground that the District was too small to qualify
as an employer within the Act’s definition of employer.
The ADEA defines “employer” to mean “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2)
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a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality
of a State or a political subdivision of a State,”
The issue presented was whether a state entity must employ 20 or more
employees in order for it to be an employer under the ADEA? This statutory
interpretation issue originates from Congress’ amendment to the ADEA well
over four decades ago in 1974. Prior to the 1974 amendment, state or local
government entities were not employers under the ADEA. However, in 1974,
Congress amended the ADEA to extend its protection to state and local
government employees by specifying that the term employer “also means” a
state or political subdivision of a state. However, the Act is silent on whether
a state or political subdivision of a State is also required to meet the 20 or
more employees’ threshold.
The District argued that when Congress added “also means” to the ADEA,
the legislators intended to merely clarify that states and their political
subdivisions were qualified to be employers, provided that they had 20 or
more employees. On the other hand, the firefighters argued that when
Congress added “also means” to the ADEA, the legislators intended to add
new categories of employers to the definition, such that states and political
subdivisions qualified as employers regardless of whether they employ 20 or
more employees.
The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Ninth Circuit that states and
political subdivisions are employers within the meaning of the ADEA’s
definitional provision regardless of whether they employ 20 or more
employees. The Court held that the ordinary meaning of “also means” is
additive rather than clarifying. The Court reasoned that the words “also
means” occur dozens of times throughout the United States Code and they
typically carry an additive meaning. The Court found that, similar to
Congress’ amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) in 1974 that
extended the FLSA’s definition of employer to all government entities
regardless of their size, the ADEA warrants a similar interpretation especially
because many aspects of the ADEA are based on the FLSA. Accordingly, the
Court held that the ADEA carries no numerical threshold with regard to its
application to states and political subdivisions.
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Exclusive Representation

In Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization, 2018 WL 4654751 (D. Minn. Sept.
27, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), pet. cert. filed No. 18719 (Dec. 4, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin the Board of Trustees of the Minnesota State Colleges and
Universities, St. Cloud State University, and the Inter Faculty Organization
(“IFO”) from “regarding the IFO as her representative and allowing it to
speak on her behalf.”
The plaintiff was a tenured professor of political science who had worked at
St. Cloud State University for 19 years. The IFO was elected and certified in
1975 as the exclusive representative for the faculty at Minnesota’s seven
public universities. According to Minnesota’s Public Employment Labor
Relations Act (PELRA), election of an exclusive representative obligates the
public employer to meet and negotiate about “issues surrounding the terms
and conditions of employment.” PERLA also “grants public employees,”
through their exclusive representatives, “the right to ‘meet and confer’ with
their employers on matters outside the scope of mandatory negotiations.”
The plaintiff, who has never been a member of the IFO and disagrees with
the IFO on many issues, argued that the exclusive representation provisions
of the PELRA compelled her speech in violation of her First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. The court, however,
denied the preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not establish a
likelihood that she would prevail on the merits of her claim. In analyzing the
likelihood of success, the court cited Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), where, the plaintiffs argued that
exclusive representation under the PELRA violated their First Amendment
rights by requiring the exclusive representative to speak on behalf of all
employees in “meet and confer sessions.” The Supreme Court held that the
PELRA did not restrain the the claimants’ freedom to speak on any
education-related issue or to associate or not associate with whom they
pleased, including the exclusive representative.” Uradnik argued that PELRA
compelled her to speak through the IFO, an argument she maintained was
not before the Court in Knight. However, the court rejected this argument,
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reasoning that “[t]he Court in Knight broadly rejected the appellee’s First
Amendment . . . arguments, indicating that the decision applies regardless of
the type of speech at issue.” Furthermore, in Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d
570 (8th Cir. 2018), a case attacking exclusive representation of home health
care aids, the “appellants made multiple compelled-speech arguments in
their briefing.” That court held that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction
between this case (Bierman) and Knight.”
The plaintiff relied upon Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018). The court rejected this argument, because in Janus it “[was not
disputed that the State may require that a union serve as exclusive bargaining
agent for its employees.” Furthermore, the “main distinction” between Janus
and the plaintiff’s claim was that Janus concerned non-members being made
to subsidize the union through fees. Uradnik “[wa]s not required to pay fees,
attend meetings, endorse the union, or take any other direct actions against
her will.” The court also cited Bierman as holding that “recent holdings in
Janus . . . do not supersede Knight.”
The court further held that “[e]ven if Knight and Bierman did not preclude
the plaintiff’s compelled speech argument,” the PELRA would pass the
relevant level of constitutional scrutiny for compelled speech: exacting
scrutiny. To survive an exacting scrutiny analysis, a statute must “serve a
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” The court held that
the PELRA serves the interest of providing Minnesota public employees with
“representation and greater bargaining power” and “promotes the
compelling state interest of labor peace.” The court further held that these
interests could not be accomplished through significantly less restrictive
means. Without exclusive representation, “the Union’s power and
persuasion would be significantly eroded and the state interest in labor peace
would be undermined.”
On December 3, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Uradnik filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court the following day.
B.

Fair Share Fees

In Riffey v. Rauner, 910 F. 3d 314 (7th Cir. 2018), the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit denied class action status to a claim for restitution of fair
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share fees paid by home health care assistants that had been held
unconstitutional in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014). Following
the Supreme Court’s decision, on remand to the district court, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to substitute new named plaintiffs and to
substitute Governor Bruce Rauner for Pat Quinn. They sought to certify a
class that included all non-union assistants who had fair-share fees collected
from them from April 2008 until the date on which Harris was decided. The
district court denied the motion to certify the class because the class was too
broad, the named plaintiffs did not adequately represent the class, and the
class appeared unmanageable. Because Harris had resolved the class-wide
question about fair-share fees, only individual issues concerning relief
remained. The Seventh Court affirmed, and the assistants went back to the
Supreme Court. The Court held Riffey in abeyance while it decided Janus v.
AFSCME Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The Court remanded Riffey to
the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of Janus.
The Seventh Circuit noted that Janus and Harris differed at the outset
because the plaintiff in Janus was a state employee, while the Harris plaintiff
was not. This meant that the Janus Court had to confront its prior decision
in Abood v. Detroit Board. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Janus had no impact on the remaining claims in Riffey;
the Supreme Court had already dealt with the fair-share fee issue when it
decided Harris. The court reiterated its reasoning from its holding in 2017,
the first time it affirmed the denial of class certification, “[T]he question
whether damages are owed for many, if not most, of the proposed class
members can be resolved only after a highly individualized inquiry.” The
appellate court noted that each putative class member would have to discuss
his or her individual support or opposition to the union and any injuries
opponents experienced. In turn, the union could assert defenses against each
member. Further, even without the class certification, individuals still could
pursue any funds to which they were entitled. In light of the above, the
Seventh Circuit again affirmed the district court’s decision to deny class
certification to the plaintiffs.

